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HUMAN

RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER

BY PROFESSORS MC DOUGAL, LASSWELL AND CHEN
BOOK REVIEW
by Professor Winston P. Nagan*

[A] 11 men have a common humanity ... there
is a oneness in the world which binds all men
together.
Justice William 0. Douglas, An Almanac

of Liberty 3 (1954), cited in Thomas I.
Emerson, Justice Douglas and Lawyer

with a Cause, 89 Yale Law Journal 619
(1980).

Iuman rights and its role in contemporary public order evoke
passionate commitment from some I and scorn from others. 2 The
human rights literature traditionally inspires support for a higher law,
and a "morality" of law associated with concepts of natural law,
natural rights and natural justice. 3 Yet to the positivist or realist
Professor of Law, University of Florida. B.A. (Juris), M.A., University of Oxford; LL.M., M.C.L., Duke University;J.S.D., Yale University.
1.
11. Lauterpacht, An International Bill Of The Rights Of Man (1945).
2.
Professor Antony Flew in a recent piece calls the Universal Declaration of Human Rights "notorious." Flew, What is a Right, 13 Ga. L. Rev. 1117,
1135 (1979). Flew also maintains that "any formulation of such claims, and
any reporting of them, is bound to sound absurd." Id. I shudder to think
of what he would write about the book under review!
3.
J. Maritain, The Rights of Man and Natural Law (D. Anson trans.
1943).
*
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it may stand accused of being nothing more than "nonsense on
stilts.' 4 To its detractors, human rights are often thought to be
unrealistic, without content, vacuous and even, in some circles,
dangerous. 5 Yet we find that the parade of global horror stories
impels us to the view that human rights can and should be important,
whatever its practical and theoretical flaws. Reality is unpleasant:
we are told that terror squads kill 15,000 in Guatemala; that there
are 10,000 political prisoners in the Soviet Union; that under the
Amin regime in Uganda there were some 50,000 summary executions. 6 If the reality of practical deprivations were not enough,
the articulation of human rights on ideological lines 7 has further
muddied the utility of the human rights perspective.
Are human rights culture-bound? Are human rights a Western
invention, based on Lockean concepts of individuality and right,
whose impact is to institutionalize class divisions both nationally
and globally? Or, are human rights only to be seen through the
collectivist vision-a vision embraced by 8the socialist bloc and now
affirmed by Third World theorists as well?
To add to these complexities, it is claimed by some that the
use of human rights as an instrument of foreign policy simply broadens the ideological cleavages between the rich industrial West and
the Socialist and nonaligned countries. 9 Worse still is the view
that the human rights focus of American foreign policy 10 is a threat
4.
J. Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham 501 (1843).
5.
See Hoffmann, The Hell of Good Intentions, 29 Foreign Policy 3,
7-9 (1977); Kissinger, Continuity and Change in American Foreign Policy, 15
Society 97, 102 (1977); Evans & Novak, Human Rights Zeal That Costs US
jobs, Washington Post, Sept. 18, 1978, at 23, col. 1; Regan, Argentina's Views
on Human Rights, The Miami News, Oct. 20, 1978, at 13, col. 1.
6.
Robertson, Human Rights: A Global Assessment, in Human Rights
and American Foreign Policy 9 (D. Kommers & G. Loescher eds. 1979) (hereinafter cited as Kommers & Loescher].
7.
See Farer, On a Collision Course: The American Campaign for
Human Rights and the Antiradical Bias in the Third World, in Kommers &
Loescher, supra note 6 at 265.
8.
Shipler, Pravda Cautions U.S. on Rights Criticism, N.Y. Times,
March 14, 1977, at Al, col. 5. See also Reddaway, The Theory and Practice
of Human Rights in the Soviet Union, in Kommers & Loescher, supra note 6
at 115; Zvobgo, A Third World View, in Kommers & Loescher, supra note 6
at 90.
9.
Shipler, Pravda Cautions U.S. on Rights Criticism, N.Y. Times,
March 14, 1977, at A1, col. 5.
10. On human rights in Americai foreign policy see President Carter's
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to world peace. The specific reason supporting this conclusion is
that the deposition of the Shah could not have occurred without
United States acquiescence. It is claimed that American "approval"
of his departure was conditioned by our concern for his deplorable
record of human rights violations. The departure of the Shah, it
Gulf,
is further claimed, increased the instability of the Persian
11
inviting military adventurism and endangering world peace.
In this context of practical urgency, theoretical confusion,
and ideological hostility (at home and abroad), Professors McDougal,
Chen, and the late Professor Lasswell have rethought the entire
conception of human rights, its theoretical foundations, its methodological concerns, 12and its practical relevance to international
law and world order.
The publication of a new book by the New Haven School
is always a significant event in international law. Previous works
have ranged widely, characterized always by problems that are controversial and of contemporary relevance in the theory and practice of international law. These areas have included jurisprudential
controversies about the nature of international law, the relationship
of law and power, the management of violence and international
security and the control and regulation of resources.
The present book, published almost eleven years after the
authors' suggestive piece, Human Rights and World Public Order:
A Framework for Policy-Oriented Inquiry,1 3 is a substantial book,
both in volume (958 pages) and in content. It is literally packed
with ideas and insights about the nature of law, justice and international order. Indeed, some of the individual chapters are so
"meaty" that they could have been separately published in book
inaugural address, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1977, at Bl, col. 1. See also President's
Commencement Address at the University of Notre Dame, May 22, 1977, 39
Review of Politics 291 (1977). See also House Subcomm. on Intl Organizations
& Movements of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93rd. Cong., 2d Sess., Human
Rights in the World Community: A Call for U.S. Leadership (1974); Vance,
Human Rights and Foreign Policy, Dep't State Bull. No. 505 at 76 (1977).
11. The specific reference is to a statement made by Governor Reagan
on C.B.S. News Thursday, Sept. 25, 1980. The failure of the Nixon administration on the human rights front is well-documented elsewhere. See Cohen,
Human Rights Decision-Making in the Executive Branch: Some Proposalsfor
a Coordinated Strategy, in Kommers & Loescher, supra note 6 at 226.
12. M. McDougal, H. Lasswell & L. Chen, Human Rights and World
Public Order (1980) [hereinafter cited as McDougall.
13. 63 Am.J. Intl L. 236 (1969).
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form. It is the reviewer's understanding that the original enterprise
envisioned multiple volumes. Professor Lasswell's untimely illness
and death restricted the scope of the enterprise. Executing the
project in these circumstances must have been emotionally and
technically difficult. The outcome however is a tightly organized
volume rich in understanding and insight.
Human Rights and World Public Order is certainly not an easy
book. It took years of mature reflection and sustained intellectual
effort to write. The authors bring considerable learning and authority to bear on the central ideas of law, power and justice. It
requires a substantial intellectual effort to read. The trip, indeed
the odyssey, is a rewarding and recommended experience.
Analytical philosophers and lawyers have sought to narrow
the scope of human rights severely by focusing analysis on the
criterion of universality. 4 To the extent that there are few, if
any, "rights" that hold for all situations, there can correspondingly
be few, if any, human rights in "existence." For example, when
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (i.e., its specific provisions) lends itself to either qualifications and exceptions, it cannot
claim the imprimatur of being truly universal and therefore there
15
cannot be "human rights" in any absolutist or universal sense.
This position is ubiquitous in the philosophic literature on human
rights, and remains problematic. Essentially, the perspective works
on a particular conception of what rights in Ieneral are, and a mode
of analysis by which rights are "derived." '1
From an analysis
of what rights are, emerge answers to further questions such as:
what human rights are, what relationship exists between human
rights and moral rights and between human rights and legal rights. 1 7
14. For an excellent discussion of the philosophical problems of universalisability, see Hare, Universalisability, in Essays on the Moral Concepts
13-28 (1972).
15. M. Cranston, What Are Human Rights? (1962).
16. Id. See also Flew, supra note 2.
17. Positivists objectify law by isolating a criterion of validity. A
rule of law is a rule of law if it can be logically deduced from such a criterion.
The criterion itself is usually deemed to be meta-legal. Cf. Kelsen, General
Theory of Law and State (1945). Moral rights, on the other hand, are not
established by a validating criterion, but are 'Justified."
In the positivist
lexicon, the Declaration of Human Rights is not law, but something in the
nature of positive morality. Once consigned to the realm of moral discourse,
its lack of absolute universality throws doubt on its intrinsic moral value. Technically the problem of how A can convinm. B that A has a moral right is to show
that A's moral right is objective. This means that without a criterion of formal
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Legal realists realized that an excessively dichotomous approach
to law and social science tended to obscure rather than facilitate
inquiry and the accretion of knowledge for practical decisionmaking. McDouga 18 in particular drew attention to the complementarity of the mental devices of "law" (rules, principles, standards, doctrine). Modem analytical theory has remained impervious
to these criticisms. For example, Professor Flew, in a recent piece,
tells us that the first conceptual "truth" about rights is that they
' '19
are "entitlements and must possess some kind of objectivity.
Apart from the objective-subjective dichotomy, the problem of
circularity is obvious: a right is an entitlement is a right is an....
The authors of the book under review noted the intellectual
confusion (ambiguity, circularity, astigmatism) when they wrote:
Even the very concept of human rights itself
does not escape . .. highly technical normative
ambiguous ... concepts which purport to make
simultaneous reference to varying factual
contexts, to claims made to authority, and
to
20
responses by authoritative decision-makers.
I would suggest that the theory of rights one adopts has vast
implications for the adequacy of the forms of inquiry about law
and human rights. I suspect that a more detailed analysis of how
the authors' conception of rights transcends existent paradigms 2 1validity as in law, one has to justify the existence of the right with reasons that
are intrinsic to the self (A).
The nature of morality in the philosophic sense is highly controversial
as are the criteria by which moral rights are derived. For example, Kant derived
his conception of moral rights from reason; Kierkegaard from religion; Nietzche
from power; Mill from utility; Marx from economic class or history. See
Gewirth, The Basis and Content of Human Rights, 12 Ga. L. Rev. 1113, 1114
(1979).
18. McDougal, The Ethics of Applying Systems of Authority: The
Balanced Opposites of a Legal System, in The Ethics of Power 221 (H. Lasswell
& H. Cleveland eds. 1962).
19. Flew, supra note 2 at 1125. Flew also concedes that a theory of
rights must have a factual reference. Rights, he says, must also be "grounded
in some fact or facts of their bearers."
20. McDougal,supra note 12.
21. The relevant discussion is on pp. 63-71 and 73-79. Here the authors
attack the model of rules and its traditional mode of exposition-logical syntactic
derivation. The key citation in this discussion (190) cites back to note 171,
which note tells us that just about everyone writing in the human rights area
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of legal and philosophical thought would have been immensely helpful in more adequately understanding what the authors call past
confusions,2 2 and would perhaps make for a fairer and more serious
uses logical syntactical derivation. If this is right, then the importance of the
"mode of exposition" to our appreciation of the nature of human rights and
how we perceive them is obvious. To the extent that configurative analysis
transcends either the metaphysics of dialectical materialism or the astigmatism
of reality shrinking syntactical logical derivation, it presents an alternative
paradigm that perhaps requires fuller exposition. The late Professor Lasswell
firmly believed that a "totally different technique of thinking" was needed, if
the social sciences were to be relevant to human purposes. H. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics S1 (1930). And the problem of a relevant social science
was how to connect "actualities" to emergent "potentialities" was in the
first instance to be resolved by the imaginative orientation of the self as
observer.

22. The conceptual underpinnings of the policy sciences are rooted
mainly, though not exclusively, in the pragmatic tradition (other influences
include Bentham, Freud, Marx, Whitehead, Merriam and others). I suspect that
one of the innovations as well as one of the difficulties with philosophical pragmatism was the effort to collapse the distinction between the world of conceptualism and the world of phenomena in the cause of instrumentalism. Instrumentalism essentially meant practical judgment based on practical action.
Pragmatism works on the assumption that knowledge for the sake of knowledge
is so often abstracted from the needs of social process that a legitimate philosophic function reposes in the idea of knowledge for human purposes. If this
is cecepted, theoretical inquiry is more fruitfully directed to collapsing the
dualism between the conceptual and normative on the one hand, and the world
of "events" on the other. One objective here is that the certitude of moral and
conceptual discourse should be conditioned by the insecurity and perhaps
impermanence of experience. What makes this idea so theoretically subversive
is that the domain of thinking becomes open to the possible creation of alternate
symbologies and alternate myths. Such a perspective would test the central
myths and ideologies of a society and open them to reformulation and change.
To the extent that a prevailing myth system sustains differential value allocations, change threatens the guardians of the myth and those who benefit from it.
The philosophical problem created by this issue is often formulated in terms
of the rationality which is presumed to repose in the domain of the world of
concepts and the problem of deriving values from the world of cause and effect.
Modern philosophers find it unhelpful to "confuse" statements that are
conceptual (or normative) with statements of fact, because the truth of a con.
cept or norm can only be derived from logic, not the empirical world, whereas
the validation of an empirical statement lies in the world of cause and effect.
From the modern philosophical perspective statements that confuse norms
and facts are "nonsense" statements which do not communicate either knowledge or meaning in an acceptable philosophical sense. It should be noted,
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assessment of their own contribution.
It appears to this reviewer that Human Rights and World
Public Order looks at the concept of a right as an outcome of the
myth-system of a political and legal culture. A fuller appreciation
however, that the pragmatist is not asking the ultimate question of knowledge
or meaning: he is concerned with practical knowledge and practical meaning
located phenomenally in actual space and time. This does not obviate the
larger question about knowledge and meaning-and the various forms that
philosophic inquiry has assumed in elucidating these notions. It becomes
more problematic when this philosophic task presumes to deny the capacity
of man to make practical judgments because we cannot know-at this timewhat absolute knowledge and meaning encompass. Lasswell himself gave careful
thought to establishing a philosophically justifiable predicate for practical
judgment-for practical decision-making. See Lasswell, Clarifying Value Judgment: Principles of Content and Procedure, in 1 Inquiry 87 (1958). Lasswell
preferred the phrase "practical rationality." Id. Key insights in this article
were inspired by John Dewey. See Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy
(1957) especially the introductory section (v-xli). Dewey believed that we could
develop concepts and normative values in instrumental terms; in terms that were
not so transcendent as to be unrelated to human affairs. He talks of the notion
of "relational universality." Id. Dewey of course was demanding a philosophy
that would weave together theory and practice. In the McDougal-Lasswell
system the influence of Dewey's philosophy is striking: social process is for
example defined in terms of relative universality viz., "the totality of value
processes for all values important in society." See Lasswell & Kaplan, Power
and Society 71 (1950). Policy is seen in terms of the nexus between theory
and practice: "Policy is a projected program of goal values and practices."
Id. And the mode of thinking required for this enterprise is "configurative"
requiring standpoints that are both "manipulative" and contemplative-the
essential prerequisites of configurative analysis.
Most practical lawyers know that the relationship between concept and
fact has been a major practical problem for any pleader schooled under the code
system of pleadings. Code pleaders were familiar with the pitfalls of pleading
either conclusions of law (conceptual) or evidentiary facts (factual) which
were bad, and finding the golden mean--symbolized by the term "ultimate
fact" which was good. The operational significance of the latter often was
a matter of practical reason. To say, for example, that A did "assault" and
"batter" Y makes simultaneous reference to factual as well as formal conditions. McDougal has called this the problem of normative ambiguity for which
there is no formal solution.
It may be finally noted that Hare himself admits that the "whole prob.
lem of the relationship between the prescriptive and the descriptive elements
in the meaning of moral judgments continues to tax ethical thinkers." See
Hare, supra note 14 at 54. See also his essay on "Descriptivism," supra note
14 at 55-75.
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of the concept of myth provides a clearer perception of "what rights
are." 23 To the extent, therefore, that myth is a creature of the
shared perspectives of a community through time, it is an outcome
of the shared subjectivities of that community. The roots of myth
are therefore an outcome of the shared perspectives of a community.
If myth is an outcome of shared subjectivities and rights are an
outcome of myth, then expectations codified in the notion of
"right" or "entitlement" are themselves an outcome of shared
subjectivities. Rights are a function of human experience; indeed,
they are a consequence and a condition of human experience.
When we regard rights as having an objective existence, we effectually assume that rights are "something" independent of human
experience and human perspective. 2 4
The consequence of such a view is to underwrite a set of expectations which codify certain types of entitlement (right) as an
objective datum without regard to the social processes that spawned
them. It obfuscates the essential point that human experience
has given us diverse systems of public order with various myths,
ideologies and entitlements. It is perhaps natural that in seeking
to preserve a particular myth-system, theorists might seek to objectify its existence. But to do so is in practical effect to support
one form of entitlement rather than another. It begs the question
of what a preferred form of entitlements should be because inter
alia the premise of such a position contains its own conclusion.
The salience of the restrictive view of human rights is that it purports to objectify a drastically limited expectation of the conditions of human deprivation; of rising common demands, and the
realistic potentials for actualizing as just and humane a social order
as men and women can reasonably posttdate.
The nature of human rights as conceived in Human Rights
and IVorld Public Order is to see human rights in symbolic terms,
and to see this symbolic significance in world society within the
23. A myth may be broadly defined as a pattern of symbols in a given
culture. Key myths are the fundamental assumptions behind a "whole body
of beliefs." McDougal, supra note 12 at 117 citing A. Dicey, Law and Public
Opinion 20 (1926). Ideology is the political myth functioning to preserve the
social structure. McDougal, supra note 12 at 123. For the analysis of symbols
see Lasswell & Kaplan, Power and Society 103-141 (1950). In its most general
significance a symbol is whatever has "meaning or significance in any sense."
Id. at 10. Probably the most important symbols are linguistic ones. Id.
24. Sec Dilard, The Policy Oriented Approach to Law, 40 Va. Q. Rev.
626,629 (1964), cited also in McDougal,supra note 12 at 74 n. 188.
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framework of contending myth systems. The principal task then
of the myth or ideology of human rights, if it is to have a relevant
place in global public order, is to give it content drawn from the
human experience and a framework for practical application in
the social process. The book shows that human rights may serve
as an instrumental symbology in the transformation of social, political and economic practices in ways that promote the common
interest in the establishment of international justice for all.
The perspective about human rights developed in this book
breaks radically with the past. It is in large measure a response
to a challenge issued by Professor Moskowitz twelve years ago
when he said:
[I] nternational human rights is still waiting for
its theoretician to systematize the thoughts and
speculations on the subject and to define its
desirable goals. Intelligent truisms do not necessarily add up to a theory. No one has yet arisen
to draw together into a positive synthesis the
facts and fancies which emerge daily from events
of bewildering complexity and to carry on an
authentic debate. International concern with
human rights is very much a theme begging for a
writer. And the scholar has not yet appeared to
redress the distortions through a calm and
systematic application of facts, to ground
abstractions in the specific, and to define the
limits of discourse. In the absence of a definite
body of doctrine, as well as of deeply rooted
convictions, international human rights have
been dealt with on the basis of the shifts and
vagaries of daily affairs and the evocations of
daily events. There is a great need for technical
resources and ability to channel the facts to
greater effect. Human rights are a matter of
international concern in an untrodden area of
systematic research. But still a greater need is
for superlative virtuosity to deal with interrights in their multiple
national human
25
dimensions.
25.

(1968).

Moskowitz, The Politics and Dynamics of Human Rights 98-99
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To meet this formidable challenge the authors structure the
book around the clarification of policies for a conception of human
rights in its most comprehensive sense. Technically, the authors
reject not only as inadequate past formulations from a juridical
perspective, but also reject the modes of analysis by which past
theorists have sought to "objectify" moral and legal rights. In its
place they present their configurative approach to human rights and
international law. This is presented with such disarming simplicity
(contextuality, problem-orientation, multiple methodologies) that
one is apt to forget that what is presupposed here is a new pardigm
26
of thinking for law, society, and social philosophy.
26. The theoretical basis of the configurative approach to international
law is also illustrated in McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, Theories About International Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 Va. J. Int'l Law

188, 196-98 (1968). The major characteristics are its emphasis on contextuality, its problem-orientation; its integration of multiple methodologies across
disciplinary lines. The development of the configurative mode of analysis
may be seen from the following excerpts of Professor Lasswell's writings:
Now the whole world of "causation" is implicated
in any event, and the whole number of significant
mechanisms which may be discerned in the 'mind at
the moment" is infinite. So our hypothetical volume
might conclude by accepting the assumption that some
events can be brought about my more than chance
frequency, subject to the reservation that experimental
confirmation is never reliable as to the future. The
critical configurations may never "reappear" We com-

monly say that the probability of an event's future
repetition is greater if it has been oft repeated in the
past. But there is no means of demonstratingthat the
future contains analogous configurations to the elapsed.

The probability of the future repetition of an event
is "no probability." If events appear to be predictable, this is so because our knowledge of contingencies
is limited, and our sequences of similar configurations
may still be treated as special instances of "no sequence." The stable is a special case of the unstable,
to put the ultimate paradox.
H. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics 260 (1930). (Italics added.)

Now it is impossible to abolish uncertainty by
the refinement of retrospective observations, by the
accumulation of historical detail, by the application of
precision methods to elapsed events; the crucial test
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The book is divided into four parts. Part I delineates the human
rights problem in contemporary terms. The notion of a "problem"
in this scheme is essentially the gulf-as perceived by a disengaged
observer-between what people in fact want and what they in fact
get. In the human rights context this means the difference between
meeting expectations (common demands) and the actualities of
deprivation and nonfulfillment. The authors set out the key conditions affecting human rights deprivations as developed in their
comprehensive scheme. 2 7 In a highly technical analysis the authors
of adequate analysis is nothing less than the future verification of the insight into the nature of the master
configuration against which details are constructed.
Each specific interpretation is subject to redefinition
as the structural potentialities of the future become
actualized in the past and present of participant observers. The analyst moves between the contemplation
of detail and of configuration, knowing that the soundness of the result is an act of creative orientation rather
than of automatic projection. The search for precision
in the routines of the past must be constantly chastened
and given relevance and direction by reference to the
task of self-orientation which is the goal of analysis.
H. Lasswell, World Politics and Personal Insecurity 17 (1935).
Any problem-solving approach to human affairs
poses five intellectual tasks, which we designate by five
terms familiar to political scientists-goal, trend, conditions, projection, and alternative. The first question,
relating to goal, raises the traditional problem of clarifying the legitimate aims of a body politic. After
goals are provisionally clarified, the historical question
arises. In the broadest context, the principal issue is
whether the trend of events in America or throughout
the world community has been toward or away from
the realization of preferred events. The next question
goes beyond the simple inventories of change and asks
which factors condition one another and determine
history. When trend and factor knowledge is at hand,
it is possible to project the course of future developments on the preliminary assumption that we do not
ourselves influence the future. Finally, what policy
alternatives promise to bring all preferred goals to
optimal fulfillment?
H. Lasswell, The Future of Political Science 1-2 (1963).
27. The Law Science and Policy value scheme (power, wealth, respect,
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show the core interdependence of values, a fact which is central
to the configurative mode of analysis for a viable jurisprudence
of human rights. This analysis also suggests the inadequacy of
logical syntactical modes of derivation, and decision when one seeks
to elucidate seriously the content of human rights and secure its
practical application in given situations. After providing a critique
of earlier theoretical formulations the authors develop a systematic
and comprehensive taxonomy of claims that have human rights
significance. The first part of the book concludes with an imaginative identification of agencies of decision specialized to responding
to human rights claims. The authors conceptualize this as "the
global constitutive process of authoritative decision."
The second part of the book seeks to clarify the basic policies
that attend human rights in such a way as to respond to their comprehensive map of human rights claims. Perhaps the most original
section of this part of the book is the effort to develop a means by
which abstract principles may be applied to concrete problems
within the framework of the configurative scheme. The authors
develop a set of principles of content and procedure designed to
guide the application of choice in ways that rationally and consciously promote the common interest. This section of the book
may perhaps be the most difficult and trying for the novice. It
is also one of its most significant features; it goes a long way toward
complementing advances made in decision theory.
Part III deals with selected claims to which the preceding
framework is applied. These claims encompass those relating to
respect which is seen as the core value of a viable human rights
program. The outcomes of the failure to honor the respect value
reflect well-known deprivations such as slavery, apartheid, sexual,
religious and racial discrimination and the like. Respect is defined as
"An interrelation among individual human beings in which they
reciprocally recognize and honor one another's freedom of choice
about participation in the value processes of the world community or
any of its component parts." The authors go on to stress that,
"Respect includes not only ... perceptions of worth by which the
individual is characterized by himself and others, but also the translation of these perspectives into the operative facts of social
process." 2 8 The handling of specific respect-related claims such
affection, enlightenment, well-being, rectitude, skill) were developed as essen.
tially functional categories. They bear a close resemblance to the "'values"
in the Declaration of Human Rights.
28.

McDougal,

mpra note 12 at 451-52.
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as the elimination of slavery, racial discrimination and apartheid are
all significant contributions to our understanding of these
phenomena from an international perspective and a realistic perception (understanding) of what the potentials of collective action
are for their elimination. The sections dealing with apartheid and
racial discrimination are particularly good. In a rare lapse the
authors define aparthead as a "comprehensive and systematic pattern
of racial discrimination. " 2 9 Yet on page 523 the authors declare
that apartheid is "much more than mere racial discrimination." The
inconsistence appears to detract from what the authors themselves
correctly show to be the basic nature of the apartheid system: "a
complex set of practices of domination and subjection, intensely
hicrarchized and sustained by the whole apparatus of the state,
which affects the distribution of all values." 3 0 While the chapters on
both racial discrimination and apartheid are excellent from a lawyer's
perspective, they appear to fall short on the integration of scientific
data to throw light on the deeper significance of the phenomena of
race prejudice. If these and other chapters relating to the selected
claims have a drawback, they seem to minimize the scientific
component of the law science and policy paradigm. Notwithstanding
this drawback, the book makes a significant contribution to the
literature of the social sciences. The isolation of the comprehensive
taxonomy of claims-in-fact suggests fruitful lines for theory construction and directions for empirical inquiry. Additionally, the
location of key problems in a contextual setting is enormously
suggestive of the possible inadequacy of preexisting theory about,
e.g., race relations, the nature of "sexuality" and "aging." I would
suggest that where preexisting theories are formulated in the absence
of contextual and developmental considerations, especially considerations of control and authority, the knowledge thus generated
may be very partial and even possibly misleading. This section of the
book contains chapters that deal with the problems of sex discrimination, religious discrimination, language discrimination, age discrimination, discrimination against aliens, etc.
The last part of the book provides us with a reevaluation
of the entire notion of privacy. The authors develop in substitution
for the limited conception of privacy, the notion of the civic order.

29.
30.

Id. at 521.
Id. at 523.
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The penultimate sectionMl of the book gives us a glimpse of the
"future prospects" for the realization of a conception of transnational order and justice that seeks to transcend existent paradigms
of public order. The authors conceptualize this as the "civic order."
The authors see the incipient elements of the civic order in the
doctrine of privacy. But the concept of a civic order is much broader
and richer than the limited and somewhat confusing doctrine of
privacy. The basic idea behind the civic order is the conception of
"a freeman's common wealth." This conception perceives a social
process in which the coercive power of the state is highly circumscribed. In this view the key choices about the distribution of
values are made according to conceptions of private ordering in
which the expectations of sanction application are mild and in which
coercion is limited.
This then is the broad outline of the book itself. Perhaps
its most salient contribution to the literature of international law
lies in its effort to relate the human rights program of the world
community to a viable jurisprudential framework which accounts
for and critiques the contributions of prior approaches and its
effort within the framework of an alternative paradigm to illustrate
the practical utility of human rights in the making and application
of law. In this sense, then, the authors demonstrate that law-making
is a dynamic ongoing process and that a wide range of indicia are
crucial to what they call the prescribing function, if law is to be
defined in terms of perspectives of expectation and change. More
important, they underscore the point that human rights perspectives
are an indispensible component of international law when defimed
in terms of process rather than rules. The book itself is meant to
be a part of the prescribing process in action. Human Rights and
World Public Order is not just a book about the they and method
of human rights inquiry (the contemplative aspect of configurative
analysis); it also seeks to create and recreate a human rights 'law"
for the world community. The book is part of the law-making
process itself.
Human Rights and World Public Order is a profoundly good
book. It is inspired by a high sense of civic responsibility and an
insistent demand that intellectual rigor should be joined with an

31. The last chapter in the book is labeled Appendix and is based
on the authors' pioneering piece: McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, Nationality
and Human Rights: The Protection of the Individual in External Arenas, 83
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inclusive conception of the indivisibility of man and his quest for
justice. The book is a fitting culmination to Professor Lasswell's
creative genius. It is also a landmark contribution to the literature
of human rights.
For Professor Lasswell, McDougal and Chen
of knowing that they have been controis
the
satisfaction
there
versial, unsettling, and in all probability right.

